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With competing assumptions and alternative empirical models, scholars have come to rather differ-
ent conclusions about the impact of public preferences on the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Some have found the justices to be attentive to mass opinion, while others have judged it to be irrel-
evant. Across this divide, however, one assumption is widely shared; that is, political scientists gen-
erally agree upon how best to measure the Court’s outputs. In this analysis, we employ an alternative
estimate of the justices’ liberalism, one which we think better reflects the underlying ideological tenor
of their policies. With data from 1953 to 1996, we compare time-series models using different indi-
cators of the Supreme Court’s aggregate liberalism. Our results suggest that, in addition to being moti-
vated by their own preferences, the justices are highly responsive to public mood, as well.
Among the more vexing issues for judicial scholars is the role of public opinion
in the Supreme Court. For quite some time, political scientists have debated, both
theoretically and methodologically, whether and how popular preferences are
translated into judicial policy. To some, appointed justices with lifetime tenure
are insulated from popular pressure (Segal and Spaeth 2002). To others, the
Supreme Court’s dependence upon other institutions to give force to its rulings
creates a need to remain attentive to the changing course of popular attitudes
(Adamany and Grossman 1983). In addition to the competing expectations
created by constitutional design, the evidence on this question is equally uncer-
tain. Empirically, there is strong evidence that both corroborates and contradicts
the causal link between public preferences and Supreme Court decision making
(Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Northpoth and Segal 1994). Indeed, the most recent
analyses conclude that, while individual justices respond to public sentiment
(Flemming and Wood 1997), the extent to which the Court’s policies represent
popular opinion is indeterminate, at best (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995;
cf. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002)). How does one resolve these com-
peting perspectives?
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We believe that there is good reason for the justices to be attentive to public
opinion. Specifically, we posit that, since the justices do not have the institutional
capacities to give their rulings full effect, they must calculate the extent to which
popular decision makers will support their policy initiatives. Thus, while the
Court is certainly not electorally accountable, those responsible for putting its
rulings into effect frequently are. For that reason, strategic justices must gauge
the prevailing winds that drive reelection-minded politicians and make decisions
accordingly (Murphy 1964). That is, justices who want to see their personal pref-
erences expressed in public policy know that the effectiveness of such policy
depends upon whether it is accepted by its implementers and those to whom they
are responsible. By this logic, a Court that cares about its perceived legitimacy
must rationally anticipate whether its preferred outcomes will be respected and
faithfully followed by relevant publics. Consequently, a Court that strays too far
from the broad boundaries imposed by public mood risks having its decisions
rejected. Naturally, in individual cases, the justices can and do buck the trends of
public sentiment. In the aggregate, however, popular opinion should still shape
the broad contours of judicial policymaking.
Proceeding along these theoretical lines, we develop time-series models of
Supreme Court liberalism in three broad policy domains and uncover a substan-
tial degree of sensitivity to public opinion, even when the ideological composi-
tion of the Court is held constant. In so doing, we rely upon a recent innovation
in the measurement of Supreme Court policy. Simply stated, we place primary
analytic weight upon the Supreme Court’s decisions that reverse the outcomes of
lower courts. As we explain, reversals, taken by themselves, are a more valid indi-
cator of the Court’s outputs; reliance upon all cases—i.e., reversals as well as
affirmances—contaminates an accurate estimate of the ideological direction of
the Court’s policies. By analyzing Supreme Court liberalism through the lens of
reversals alone, we show that the impact of public mood is far greater than pre-
viously documented.
In the following sections, we lay out our theoretical expectations regarding the
role of public preferences in the Court as well as our rationale for an alternative
dependent variable. We then present and discuss our results in connection with a
broader theory of dynamic representation.
Public Opinion and the Court
By constitutional design, the nexus between public opinion and public policy
is more limited for the Supreme Court than it is for the President and members
of Congress. Yet this institutional insularity actually belies interesting relation-
ships that exist between the judicial branch and mass publics. Citizens, it turns
out, respond to the Court and its policies in systematic ways. Among other things,
research has illuminated the sources of political support for the Court, as well as
how the justices’ decisions have shaped opinions on specific issues (see, e.g.,
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Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Hoekstra 2000; Marshall
1989; Mondak 1994). Thus, a good deal is known about how public opinion
moves in response to the Court’s outputs.
Reversing the causal arrow, scholars have likewise contemplated the impact of
public preferences on judicial policy. Few dispute that public opinion is reflected
in the choices of the Court. The mechanism by which it takes place, though, has
been subject to considerable disagreement. One highly plausible hypothesis is
that public opinion determines Supreme Court policy indirectly: elections deter-
mine the composition of Congress and the White House, whose members in turn
select the justices. Presidents and Senators, who necessarily reflect majority pref-
erences, are motivated to select justices with whom they share an ideological
affinity (Segal and Spaeth 2002). As a result, the ideological orientation of the
Court generally corresponds to the attitudes of the electorate (Dahl 1957; Funston
1975; see also Gates 1987).
There is considerable intuitive appeal to this explanation, inasmuch as it under-
girds the most widely accepted explanation for the observed changes in Supreme
Court policy. Under the precepts of the attitudinal model, the preferences of the
justices are virtually the sole determinant of their voting behavior (Segal and
Spaeth 2002). Barring changes in the Court’s docket, any variation in the ideo-
logical direction of the Court’s outputs is necessarily a function of membership
change, a process that is highly likely to produce justices who serve as contem-
poraneous reflections of the electorate’s preferences. That the Supreme Court’s
outcomes may comport with popular opinion is scarcely a wonder; it is merely a
manifestation of selecting ideologically driven justices whose preferences
roughly match those of the electorate more generally. Illustrating this view,
Justice Scalia has noted that “it’s a little unrealistic to talk about the Court as
though it’s a continuous, unchanging institution rather than to some extent nec-
essarily a reflection of the society in which it functions. Ultimately, the justices
of the Court are taken from society . . . and however impartial they may try to be,
they are going to bring with them those societ[al] attitudes” (quoted in O’Brien
2000, 343). Whether this forecloses the possibility of a Supreme Court that
responds more immediately to changes in popular opinion is certainly debatable.
Taken on its own terms, though, there is little doubt that this indirect influence
is a principal determinant of the Court’s decisional outcomes.
In addition to this indirect linkage, scholars have also posited a direct causal
connection between public preferences and Supreme Court policy. In this tradi-
tion, some scholars have painted with a fairly broad brush, noting the general
correspondence between public opinion and judicial outcomes. So, for instance,
the Court’s proclivity for countermajoritarianism seems to be dependent upon
popular preferences. In fact, the justices’ protection of minority interests tends 
to occur only when public opinion supports such outcomes (Barnum 1985; see
also Dahl 1957). The absence of careful control for alternative explanations,
however, leaves substantial room for disagreement about the degree to which
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mass opinion actually moves the Court in one direction or another (Caldeira 1991,
314).
Other scholars have proceeded with somewhat greater analytic rigor, examin-
ing whether the Court’s liberalism follows the ebb and flow of public mood, after
controlling for its indirect effects. Methodological sophistication, however, has
hardly generated consensus. Holding constant the justices’ preferences, there is
evidence of a significant causal connection between mass opinion and Supreme
Court policy, both in the aggregate and within individual issue areas (Link 1995;
Mishler and Sheehan 1993). Indeed, part of this pathway may be attributable to
public opinion actually shaping the justices’ preferences over the long term
(Mishler and Sheehan 1996). Telling as these results are, they do necessitate some
circumspection, since the estimated effects of public opinion may be quite sen-
sitive to modest changes in the specification of predictive models (Norpoth and
Segal 1994; see also Mishler and Sheehan 1996, 176).
At the level of the individual justice, voting appears to be significantly affected
by the changing patterns of public preferences over time, if only marginally so
(Flemming and Wood 1997; Mishler and Sheehan 1996; cf. Norpoth and Segal
1994). That the votes of a given member of the Court are influenced by mass
opinion does not demonstrate—at least not directly—that the Court’s cases are
decided any differently as a consequence (Flemming and Wood 1997, 472). After
all, if public opinion truly matters to the Court, then the justices ought to take it
into account and (their own preferences notwithstanding) actually decide cases
in ways that reflect the tenor of public mood. It is this link between public pref-
erences and substantive policy outcomes that we are keen to examine in this
analysis.
On the face of it, of course, there is little reason to suspect that the justices
care about public opinion at all. With agenda control, lifetime tenure, and no
political constituencies that must be appeased, the justices are largely free to make
decisions that accord with their personal preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2002).
State judges, who must often stand for reelection are one thing (Hall 1992), but
the electorally unaccountable members of the U.S. Supreme Court are quite
another. Its members do not (at least as far as we know) consult the polls prior
to rendering their decisions.
At the same time, governmental actors of all kinds care a good deal about main-
taining their ability to craft meaningful public policies. The precise mechanisms
that constrain political decision making vary across institutions, obviously. Still,
in one way or another, public officials in a constitutional system require support—
from legislators, from bureaucrats, from judges, and ultimately from the public—
in order to achieve and sustain their objectives.
One way in which policy makers ensure that support is by conforming their
behavior to fit the preferences of those whose backing they will later require.
Through rational anticipation, governmental actors “sense the mood of the
moment, assess its trend, and anticipate its consequences for [the] future . . .”
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(Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995, 545). For some, the need to monitor the
political winds is especially acute; election-minded members of Congress, for
example, rapidly adjust their policies in response to the changing tastes of voters.
Presidents, as well, find that the success of their policy ambitions rise and fall
with the tide of public sentiment; so they, too, must forecast the effects of popular
opinion.
The Supreme Court, by contrast, need not worry over the same practical con-
cerns as elected officials. Still, it does not necessarily follow that the justices are
indifferent to changes in public preferences. To the contrary, it has long been sus-
pected that the justices are quite mindful of the imperative of maintaining soci-
etal acceptances of their powers and policies. “To a large extent,” according to
Justice Frankfurter, “the Supreme Court, under the guise of constitutional inter-
pretation of words whose contents are derived from the disposition of the Jus-
tices, is the reflector of that impalpable but controlling thing, the general drift of
public opinion” (1939, 197). The principal reason, as Alexander Hamilton so
sagely observed, is that the Court “has no influence over either the sword or the
purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can
take no active resolution whatsoever. It may truly be said to have neither force
nor will but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments” ([1787–88] 1961, 465). By
this reckoning, the Court is “the least dangerous” branch because it depends upon
the good will of other institutions in order for its policies to have genuine force.
Justices who sought to raise any reasonable degree of political capital would
surely need to consider whether their preferred policies would be met with
acclaim or disdain. Estimating the nature of public mood, they should temper
their ambitions, as circumstances warrant.
This is, we think, a classic case of rational anticipation by policy makers. 
Yet we are hardly the first to posit such a relationship. At least since 
Walter Murphy’s Elements of Judicial Strategy, scholars have pondered how a
rational justice might behave when “the Justice anticipates that at this time 
a certain decision or the announcement of a policy in an opinion would stir a
political reaction which would gravely threaten that policy and probably 
judicial power itself ” (1964, 171). Notwithstanding the absence of an electoral
motive, a justice who wished to maintain institutional legitimacy for the future
would have substantial incentive to trim his sails and follow popular sentiment
in the present.
The reasons for such behavior are not terribly mysterious. The justices may
well want to see their preferences reflected in policy outcomes, but that ambition
would be fairly hollow if those policies, once promulgated, had no practical effect.
The Court requires the cooperation of legislative and executive officials, many of
whom are themselves careful auditors of mass opinion. For that reason, the
members of the Court must reflect on how well their preferred outcomes will be
received and supported by implementers. By no means does this imply that the
Court cares about public opinion in the same ways that elected officials do, but
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we do think it entirely reasonable to assume that justices want their policies to
be taken seriously by relevant publics.1
This is not just our opinion, of course. There is abundant evidence of resist-
ance, avoidance, and downright defiance from various constituencies of the 
Court (Canon and Johnson 1999). It is only when popular opinion supports 
the Court’s goals that its policies have their full effects (Rosenberg 1991). To be
sure, the Constitution affords the Supreme Court institutional independence, 
but it in no way guarantees the prestige upon which its success is so highly
dependent.
Hence, from our theoretical perspective, we see the role of rational anticipa-
tion in the Court vis-à-vis Congress and the President to be a difference of degree,
rather than kind. The justices may be comparatively insulated from public pres-
sure, but that does not guarantee that they will be oblivious to it. The mechanism
that would impel the justices to follow public opinion, we hypothesize, is the
Court’s expectations about the future consequences of its decisions. Public mood,
then, should be a barometer by which the justices estimate the extent to which
their preferred policies will likely be accepted and put into effect.
Measuring Supreme Court Outputs
Do the policies of the Supreme Court respond to public preferences? Until
rather recently, scholars who were interested in this question were frustrated by
the lack of time-series data on the overall preferences of the population. An inno-
vation in the development of a broad, aggregate measure of public opinion—the
index of public mood (Stimson 1999)—has ameliorated this problem. Ironically,
we first visit a preliminary issue of an entirely different order, one that, at first
blush, provokes no controversy: Do we have an accurate measure of the justices’
policy outputs?
Virtually all quantitative analyses provide a consistent answer to this question.
Almost without exception, models of Supreme Court decision making employ
the ideological direction of the Court’s decision as the dependent variable of
choice. This measure appears in various guises; support for the individual over
government is considered liberal behavior in civil liberties cases, while support
for business over government is treated as conservative policy in economic cases
(see, e.g., George and Epstein 1992; Hagle and Spaeth 1992). In whatever form
it appears, this measure carries with it the implicit assumption that the ideolog-
ical direction of any given case is a valid indicator of the directionality of the
Court’s outputs. In other words, using all of the justices decisions as the depend-
ent variable—either individually or in the aggregate—captures the nature of lib-
eralism on the Court. Naturally, coding cases as liberal or conservative poses its
The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited 1023
1 At the very least, they want to avoid the bureaucratic hassle of having to revisit the same issue
repeatedly to “demand” conformance, as they did in the case of school desegregation, for example
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own set of problems, but our concern lies elsewhere. Rather, we raise a more fun-
damental question, and that is whether all of the Court’s cases, even when appro-
priately coded, reflect the Court’s underlying preference order.
An Alternative Measure
Recent research has offered an alternative indicator of Supreme Court liberal-
ism: the ideological direction of the Court’s policies in only those cases where
the justices reverse the decision of the lower court (McGuire, Smith, and Caldeira
2004). The rationale behind this measure is complex, but its general outline can
be sketched here.
Parties seeking review from the Supreme Court are rational; that is, those lit-
igants who have lost in the lower courts petition the justices only when they esti-
mate that they will win on the merits. Thus, a party that judges its preferred
position to be more proximate to the Court’s ideal than the policy promulgated
in the lower court will, all things being equal, ask for relief from the justices. By
contrast, litigants do not turn to the Court if they calculate that they will lose.
Of course, those who do elect to seek certiorari can only estimate their likeli-
hood of winning, and those estimates are quite often wrong. In a formal sense,
an accurate estimate (i.e., a party correctly gauging that it will prevail on the
merits) results in the Court reversing the decision of the lower court. An inaccu-
rate estimate by a petitioner is represented by an affirmance (i.e., a party erro-
neously guessing that it would win once the Court granted its petition for review).
So, parties who have lost in the lower courts turn to the justices for relief because
they calculate that the Court will overturn lower court policies; when they are
correct in their estimate, the Court “reverses,” and when they are incorrect the
Court “affirms.”
Naturally, as the Court’s ideology changes due to personnel replacement, the
parties’ estimates of their likelihood of success likewise change. Thus, litigants
that might readily seek review at one point in time might not be as anxious to go
before the Court at some other time. Theory and systematic research (see Mishler
and Sheehan 1996; Songer, Cameron, and Segal 1994)—to say nothing of
common sense—suggest that, as the Court moves in one ideological direction, it
increases the likelihood that those who share the Court’s policy preferences will
be more likely seek certiorari. As the Court becomes liberal, liberals step up their
litigation activities before the justices. When the Court moves in a conservative
direction, conservative litigants are more prone to seek review.
Changes in the Court’s preferences, then, affect the ideological mix of those
who calculate that they will win before the justices. If the Court were, say, ide-
ologically conservative, then more of the estimates of winning (i.e., more peti-
tions) would naturally be made by conservative litigants. Logically, this means
that, not only will more of the accurate estimates be made by conservatives, but
more of the inaccurate estimates will be made by conservatives, as well. Thus,
when the Court becomes more conservative, more of the reversals (i.e., the accu-
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rate estimates) will be decided in a conservative direction and more of the affir-
mances (i.e., the inaccurate estimates) will be decided in a liberal direction. In
other words, the accurate estimates will reflect the prevailing ideology on the
Court, while the inaccurate estimates will run counter to it.
Including both the accurate and inaccurate estimates should, therefore, have
rather severe empirical consequences for measuring the ideological character of
the Supreme Court’s policymaking. One way to illustrate this empirically is by
examining correlations of time series constructed from all cases, decisions to
reverse, and decisions to affirm.2
We present three sets of such correlations in Table 1. The first two columns
show the relationship between aggregates of all cases and each of the two sub-
components. These are part-whole correlations and thus carry a positive bias.
What we see in each issue area is that the correlation of the “all cases” measure
with the reversals subset is very high, but imperfect. This suggests two things of
import, (1) that most of the valid variance comes from decisions to reverse, and
(2) that there is room to improve upon the use of the all cases, because the less
than perfect correlation implies slightly different behavior for the reversals. Even
with the upward bias, the correlations of the second column are quite low; the
content of decisions to affirm is something different from the main line of Court
decisions. If it were appropriate to test for significance in these part-whole cor-
relations, only the Civil Rights and Liberties domain would pass muster.
To get closer to the issue of whether decisions to affirm are associated with
decisions to reverse—whether, that is, we get the same or different pictures of
where the Court stands—we present correlations of the reversal and affirm series
in column 3. Without the part-whole bias, the clear interpretation of these corre-
lations is that these measures share no content. With all three correlations nega-
tive (and one significantly so), the claim of McGuire, Smith, and Caldeira (2004)
is supported in these data. The decisions to affirm lower court rulings, that is, not
only totally fail to indicate the Court’s ideology, they very weakly indicate its
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TABLE 1
Correlations of Aggregate Annual Time Series by Case Outcome Type
and Issue Area
All Cases with All Cases with Reversals with
Issue Area Reversals Affirmances Affirmances
Criminal Procedure .85 .21 -.22
Civil Rights and Liberties .85 .37 -.14
Economics .88 .05 -.33
N = 45.
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opposite, painting a conservative Court when it is liberal and a liberal Court when
it is conservative.
In Figure 1 we demonstrate the point. Taking an average of each of the three
substantive time series, we graph the aggregate liberalism of the Court that would
be uncovered by looking only at each case type. The time line for reversals com-
ports quite well with the history of the modern Court. According to this series,
it was at its pinnacle of liberalism during the 1960s and, following the appoint-
ment of Warren Burger, began a steady move to the right. Through the 1980s, it
remained largely conservative, making up some more moderate ground over the
past decade. If we were to rely upon affirmances to characterize the Court, we
would learn that the Warren Court was a hallmark of moderate conservatism, fol-
lowed by the liberal Burger era and then a turn toward the right under Rehnquist.
If the pattern for affirmances is sensible at all (and not mere noise), then it is an
upside-down world where left is right and up is down. Indeed, if we were to
regress this series on the Court’s composition, we would learn that liberal Courts
produce conservative decisions, whereas conservative Courts produce liberal
decisions!
Having illustrated the problems inherent in including affirmances in a measure
of aggregate liberalism, we now turn to a more direct investigation of the Court
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and the Public. Our focus remains on what sorts of cases are valid indicators of
the Court’s ideological position, which we join to the important substantive ques-
tion of whether or not the Supreme Court responds to changes in public opinion.
Direct Public Opinion Effects on Supreme Court Outcomes
Reconsidered
We now know that all published work examining direct public opinion influ-
ence on Supreme Court decisions is based upon suboptimal measures of the deci-
sions. Where Court liberalism is measured from both decisions to reverse and
decisions to affirm, the measures are an amalgam of valid and invalid variance.
The invalidity introduced by decisions to affirm at best introduces noise into the
measured outcomes, diluting the signal portion of the measure and attenuating
all relationships. At worst it distorts the measures into something other than what
they are supposed to be, introducing bias into estimated coefficients.
Thus the main line of our attack, with these preliminaries now established, 
is to reestimate the opinion-composition-outcomes nexus with revised and
improved measures based only upon reversal decisions. Here is the essential mod-
eling issue. As we have noted, all agree that public opinion is related to Supreme
Court outcomes. It is the process by which opinion influence comes to be felt
that is contentious. The Mishler and Sheehan (1993) claim is that public opinion
plays a direct (albeit long-lagged) influence on the Court. The Norpoth and Segal
(1994) counterclaim is that the opinion influence is entirely mediated by the
Supreme Court nomination/confirmation process which shapes the Court com-
position to match the times. The Norpoth and Segal justices take no account of
public opinion, but merely follow their own attitudes and thereby carry the influ-
ence of the presidents who nominated them and the Senates which confirmed.
Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995) report an intermediate result, where the
data are too weak to confirm or refute either claim. There, estimating a direct
opinion influence with a control for Court composition leaves both opinion and
composition short of satisfactory statistical evidence, both in the postulated direc-
tion but mutually nonsignificant in competition to explain the same outcomes.
The Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson estimation is our starting point in this
analysis. If the inclusion of the decisions to affirm weakens the measures of Court
liberalism, then improving the measure offers the prospect of overturning the
indecisive result. Because our point is both that public opinion matters and that
the measurement issue confounds the causal question, we test our hypotheses
using three different dependent series, (1) all cases as in previous analyses, (2)
the more valid reversals measure, and then to demonstrate the measurement
issues, (3) new series based only on decisions to affirm.
We postulate two causal paths connecting public opinion to Supreme Court
outcomes. We believe, with Norpoth and Segal, that the composition of the
Supreme Court carries part of the public opinion signal. Liberal presidents and
Senates, products themselves of liberal public opinion, produce liberal Supreme
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Court composition. If justices then vote their attitudes, the loop from opinion to
outcome is closed. To model this process we employ the measure of Stimson,
MacKuen, and Erikson, updated for new data. This is a measure of current Court
liberalism based upon career liberalism measures from the U.S. Supreme Court
Database for each of the serving justices.3
Our public opinion measure is Public Policy Mood (Stimson 1999) for the pre-
vious year. The one-year lag is dictated by the need to control time order.4 A
current year Mood measure would be equally appropriate from a theoretical per-
spective—for there is no reason to believe that Supreme Court justices are slow
to sense changes in the opinion climate—but it would contaminate inferences by
predicting Court actions from an opinion measured partly before and party after
the decision was rendered (cf. Flemming and Wood 1997).5 The decision is
wholly a priori; we do not formally test the predictive success of either current
year Mood or of longer lags.6
Our analytic design is to build from simplicity to complexity, taking up one
policy arena at a time and then joining all together for a more complicated latent
variable analysis. We begin with Criminal procedure cases.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. We begin with a decision in the spirit of the earlier analy-
sis (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995) by dividing the content of all Supreme
Court cases into four categories, Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights and Liberties,
Economics, and Other (the last of which is discarded). For data, we have the
Supreme Court Database for the 1953 through 1996 terms. Using the Database
coding of direction of cases, we content classify the majority position in indi-
vidual cases as liberal, conservative, or neither, and from that the lifetime liber-
alism or conservatism of individual justices is readily derived. We have chosen
three major case categories, Civil Rights and Liberties, Criminal Procedure, and
1028 Kevin T. McGuire and James A. Stimson
3 This variable is derived by calculating the simple percentage of liberal votes cast by each justice
over the course of his or her career on the Court and then, for each term of the Court, calculating the
average of those justices who were sitting on the Court. We prefer this measure, despite its minor cir-
cularity problem, because it is the strongest possible representation of the composition concept. We
are, quite consciously, using votes to predict votes. If our goal were to establish that composition mat-
tered, we would choose otherwise and be sure not to stack the case for the hypothesis. But we take
composition as a given, treating it as an alternative to the direct opinion influence we seek to demon-
strate. Thus giving it the best chance to succeed is scientifically conservative.
4 Each of the regressions to come is ordinary least squares with a lagged dependent variable spec-
ification to pick up dynamics. This is our standard estimation procedure, but the decision to employ
dynamics turns out not to be particularly interesting or important. Most of the dynamics terms to
come are nonsignificant.
5 It also bears mentioning that, to the extent that there is a contemporaneous effect of mood on the
justices, our analytic approach underestimates its impact, since what would otherwise be identified
as its simultaneous effect is attributed to the lagged dependent variable.
6 As an empirical matter, of course, it is interesting to examine the impact of mood both contem-
poraneously as well as at successive lags. Although the results obviously vary across specifications,
in general our data support a significant contemporaneous impact of public mood, as well as signif-
icant effects for lags of up to five years.
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Economics,7 the number a compromise between separating matters which might
in principle produce different alignments and grouping broadly enough to have
sufficient cases in each for reliable annual measures.
For each measure we construct a time series which consists of the percent of
all votes cast by the justices on the liberal side of the issue, whichever that is, for
the year. We estimate a dynamic regression in which Court composition (average
liberalism of the nine justices) and public opinion (Moodt-1 measured as percent
liberal) compete to account for Court outcomes.
The Criminal Procedure estimations appear in the three columns of Table 2.
Focusing first on all cases, the traditional measurement approach, the result sup-
ports the claim of direct opinion influence on the Court. Both Court composition
(strongly) and public opinion (weakly) leave their imprint on Supreme Court out-
comes.8 When the model is estimated on a Criminal Procedure series consisting
only of reversals (column 2), the result strengthens considerably. The effect of
enhanced validity is seen particularly in the joint performance of both key vari-
ables, both of which grow by about half, even though they compete to explain
the same variance. Whatever one’s preferred claim, that is, the reversals series
provides better evidence for it than the series based on all cases.
To see what the decisions to affirm add when they are employed, we model
this subset in column 3. There we learn that if we measure Supreme Court lib-
eralism from these cases, outcomes are not predicted from either public opinion
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7 Civil Rights and Liberties includes the categories “Civil Rights,” “First Amendment,” “Due
Process,” and “Privacy.” Criminal Procedure is the “Criminal Procedure” category alone. Economics
includes “Unions” and “Economics.” We examine all orally argued cases decided by full opinion with
docket number (in conjunction with split votes) as the unit of analysis.
8 The public opinion result would not, however, survive a two-tailed test at the conventional .05
significance level. The one-tailed test is clearly indicated here, but we are aware that many political
scientists adopt the convention of using two-tailed tests universally.
TABLE 2
Predicting the Liberal Proportion of Annual Supreme Court Votes for
Three Types of Criminal Procedure Cases
Variable All Cases Reversals Affirmances
Criminal Procedure (t - 1) .04 -.04 .15
(.13) (.12) (.16)
Public Opinion (t - 1) .46* .71* -.16w
(.27) (.38) (.45)
Court Composition .83* 1.41* .16
(.17) (.25) (.25)
Intercept -22.83 -55.03 33.06
(15.80) (23.58) (28.73)
Standard Error of Estimate 7.20 10.43 13.26
R2 .57 .60 .03
Notes: N is 43 for all analyses. * implies p < .05 (one-tailed). w marks wrong-signed coefficients.
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or Court composition. Liberal Courts are no more likely to make liberal deci-
sions than are conservative Courts. And liberal public opinion is associated (but
not significantly) with conservative decisions. With an R2 of .03, the clear verdict
is that decisions to affirm lower court decisions are not predictable at all. This is
about the result we would observe if we used a random number generator to
produce our “dependent” variable.
CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES. We follow exactly the same procedures to model
the effects of composition and opinion in the domain of Civil Rights and Liber-
ties, the Court’s recurring agenda in the protection of rights introduced in the
Constitution and subsequently strengthened in law and practice. Here, in Table
3, the support for both opinion and composition linkages is unambiguous when
the model is estimated on the series based on all cases. Both are reasonably strong
and highly significant. But again, when the estimation employs the series based
only upon reversals, the result is cleaner and stronger. Both opinion and compo-
sition estimates grow appreciably in column 2 (partly at the expense of estimated
series dynamics).
When we repeat the step of modeling affirmances separately, we get the same
nonresult as in the Criminal Procedure case. Neither composition nor opinion
predicts decisions to affirm. Even previous levels of the Affirmance series 
have no ability to predict current levels. The series looks like random variation
in time.
ECONOMICS. Analysis of the measure of voting on economic issues produces
results roughly comparable to those already seen. We present these estimates in
Table 4. They differ slightly in offering less support for direct public opinion
influence. Here the coefficients are of slightly smaller magnitude, in the right
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TABLE 3
Predicting the Liberal Proportion of Annual Supreme Court Votes for
Three Types of Civil Rights and Liberties Cases
Variable All Cases Reversals Affirmances
Civil Rights and Liberties (t - 1) .32* .23 .04
(.13) (.14) (.14)
Public Opinion (t - 1) .54* .78* -.10w
(.19) (.32) (.36)
Court Composition .56* .91* .03
(.16) (.22) (.19)
Intercept -20.14* -45.38* 56.16*
(11.58) (19.22) (24.29)
Standard Error of Estimate 5.47 8.15 10.00
R2 .72 .70 .07
Notes: N is 43 for all analyses. * implies p < .05 (one-tailed). w marks wrong-signed coefficients.
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direction, but nonsignificant at .05. The difference, not dramatic, appears to derive
from the overall poorer model fits (and larger standard errors) for the Econom-
ics series rather than any difference in kind from the earlier analyses. Again we
see the pattern of strengthening both key variables when the more valid Rever-
sals series is the prediction target. And again the Affirmance series seems at best
noise. In this case the larger, but still nonsignificant, negative coefficients begin
to suggest that the votes to affirm portray a Court ideology opposite of reality.
ALL ISSUE DOMAINS. There is only one Supreme Court. Although its behavior may
differ as it deals with different sorts of issues, questions as basic as whether it
pays heed to public opinion or not should get a single answer, not as many answers
as there are issue domains. Thus there is something to be gained by an estima-
tion that combines all the dependent series and forces a single set of coefficients
to predict Supreme Court behavior, conceptualized as a latent ideology which
organizes the three issue domains. We estimate such a summary model with the
Kalman filter DYMIMIC setup used in Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995).
This full-information maximum-likelihood technique uses the specifics of the
issue dimensions to estimate simultaneously a latent ideology associated with all
of the three domains and fit a set of structural coefficients to estimate latent series.
Using more information, it has more statistical power than do the separate regres-
sions, and it gives us summary answers for the Court, rather than diverse, some-
times conflicting, answers that apply only in limited domains.
If in fact the domains are truly independent, we will see evidence in the failure
to predict one or more of them with the latent construct. The specific evidence
to come is indicator communality estimates, squared indicator to latent dimen-
sion correlations that become validity estimates in the latent analysis. We present
the estimates in the now familiar format in Table 5.
The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited 1031
TABLE 4
Predicting the Liberal Proportion of Annual Supreme Court Votes for
Three Types of Economic Cases
Variable All Cases Reversals Affirmances
Economic (t - 1) -.11 -.04 -.09
(.16) (.16) (.16)
Public Opinion (t - 1) .31 .52 -.48w
(.23) (.34) (.45)
Court Composition .85* 1.36* -.43w
(.17) (.34) (.26)
Intercept 1.48 -41.92 114.02
(14.33) (21.07) (32.14)
Standard Error of Estimate 6.78 9.76 12.99
R2 .53 .61 .11
Notes: N is 43 for all analyses. * implies p < .05 (one-tailed). w marks wrong-signed coefficients.
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Here we see a little novelty. First the estimated power of public opinion rises
relative to Court Composition. Both now are very strongly significant. A second
novelty is that the Reversals series is only a slight improvement on “All Cases.”
Here we think combining across domains eliminates much of the noise induced
by the decisions to affirm and makes the “All Cases” indicator more valid when
combined than for individual issue domains. But the Reversals measure is still
superior, demonstrated now in the new information about indicator communali-
ties—associations with the estimated latent ideology. These are both individually
and collectively stronger for the Reversals series. An average of the three is a
rough and ready validity estimate; the reversals emerge as notably more valid
indicators of the Court’s position.
And there is some novelty also in the analysis of affirmances, as well. With
the greater power of the estimation technique the suggestive evidence that deci-
sions to affirm measure the opposite of Supreme Court ideology now finds sta-
tistical support. Here a significant coefficient on public opinion tells the story that
increasing liberalism of opinion produces significantly more conservative
Supreme Court decisions when we use only cases which affirm lower court
rulings. According to McGuire, Smith, and Caldeira (2004), such a result is pre-
cisely what one should observe. Decisions to affirm, therefore, stand indicted as
clearly invalid measures of Supreme Court ideology.9
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9 We are aware that there are other ways of measuring Supreme Court outputs at the merits. Instead
of aggregating the justices’ votes within reversal and affirmances, we might instead rely upon the
dichotomous case outcomes and calculate the annual percentage of cases that were decided in a liberal
TABLE 5
Predicting the Liberal Proportion of Annual Supreme Court Votes: Three
Issue Types Jointly Estimated as Latent Dependent Construct
Variable All Cases Reversals Affirmances
Dynamics (Yt-1) -.38* .08 -.86*
(.12) (.18) (.11)
Public Opinion (t - 1) 1.10* 1.25* -1.05w
(.14) (.33) (.35)
Court Composition 1.53* 1.54* .18
(.19) (.30) (.23)
Intercept -77.76 -103.34 124.48
(12.67) (24.97) (21.82)
Log Likelihood -7.34 -8.49 -9.05
Communalities (Squared Correlation with Latent Dependent Concept)
Criminal Procedure .50 .59 .22
Civil Rights and Liberties .61 .79 .05
Economics .51 .58 .04
Notes: N is 43 for all analyses. * implies p < .05 (one-tailed). w marks wrong-signed coefficients.
jopo_288  8/6/04  7:43 PM  Page 1032
Conclusions
We set out trying to determine whether the Supreme Court responds directly
to movements in public opinion and whether the data used in prior analyses under-
cut accurate estimation of this relationship. We have unusually clear answers to
both. The decisions to affirm are unquestionably bad measures of the Supreme
Court’s position at best, a reversal of the state of affairs at worst. And, once that
is taken into account, public opinion is a powerful influence on the decisions of
the Supreme Court. Both conclusions are decisively supported by the evidence.
The net result of these findings is two-fold. First, from a methodological per-
spective, we have illustrated some quite significant complications that flow from
inappropriate measurement of the justices’ behavior. Scholars of the Supreme
Court are increasingly interested in the ramifications of selection bias that stem
from the justices’ nonrandom agenda setting (see, e.g., Smith 2000). Our analy-
sis highlights one such problem, and a very severe one, at that; there is system-
atic contamination in the most widely used measure of Supreme Court outputs.
We can only speculate, of course, about its implications for others who care about
statistical accounts of the Court, but we can well imagine that many empirical
models would produce vastly different results and interpretations if they were to
employ the more valid indicator of judicial policymaking.
Second and more substantively, we have found that the Court’s policy outcomes
are not only affected by public opinion, but to a degree far greater than previ-
ously documented. At the same time, we have hardly eliminated the indirect influ-
ence of mass opinion wrought by the appointment process. Reliance upon a better
measure of the Court’s behavior reveals the justices to be highly motivated by
their personal preferences, even after the significant effect of direct public pref-
erences are held constant.
That the justices rationally anticipate the future consequences of their actions
speaks well of the system of dynamic representation. After all, a Court that
requires the support of others to give life to its pronouncements must surely work
within the broad boundaries of public acceptability. We certainly do not expect
this analysis to be the last word on the role of public opinion in the judicial branch.
Given our results, however, we do believe that a system of popular representa-
tion is alive and well in the Supreme Court.
Acknowledgment

The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited 1033
direction, for both reversals and affirmances. This exercise, however, reveals that this alternative yields
no new information. The relevant series for votes and outcomes are correlated with one another at
roughly .90 or better. Since liberal case outcomes are tied directly to the number of liberal votes, this
is, after all, what one would expect.
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